The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered by Padgett, Alan G.
Luther Seminary
Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary
Faculty Publications Faculty & Staff Scholarship
2011




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty & Staff Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. For more information, please contact
tracy.iwaskow@gmail.com, mteske@luthersem.edu.
Recommended Citation
Padgett, Alan G., "The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered" (2011). Faculty Publications. 310.
https://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles/310
Published Citation
Padgett, Alan G. “The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered.” In God, Eternity, and Time, edited by
Christian. Tapp and Edmund. Runggaldier, 117–25. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011.
117
Chapter 7
The Difference Creation Makes: 
Relative Timelessness Reconsidered
Alan G. Padgett
The relationship between God and time may seem an obscure subject to some. Yet 
the more one studies it, the more convinced one becomes that this doctrine plays a 
key role in our grasp of the relationship between God and the world. I personally 
have been fascinated by this subject for several decades of my life, involving as it 
does physics, philosophy, and theology. How we understand God’s relationship to 
the world, in turn, is a central part of any theistic worldview. So despite the seeming 
obscurity of the topic to some Christian thinkers, the doctrine of divine eternity is 
an important part of any fully developed doctrine of God.
In this chapter I will consider the difference the act of creation and continuing 
creating makes to our understanding of God’s eternity. We begin by looking again 
at the idea that God’s eternity is relatively timeless, borrowing the term ‘relative’ 
from modern physics, especially relativity theory. I will also set forth the ways in 
which my thinking has changed since 1989 when I finished my doctoral work at 
Oxford which I later published as God, Eternity and the Nature of Time.1 Because 
this third viewpoint of relative timelessness is still new to many philosophers and 
theologians, even those who work on the topic of time and eternity, I will take a few 
moments to review the evidence and arguments that led me to this conclusion and 
sketch out the basic viewpoint.
7.1 What Is Relative Timelessness?
Normally scholars distinguish between two views of the relationship between God 
and time, the everlasting model (sometimes called ‘sempiternal’) and the absolute 
timelessness or atemporal model. As we know, the debate has been framed histori­
cally between these two views, with problems being pointed out for each position by 
its opponent. For some time now I have been promoting an alternative model: God 
is timeless relative to the created spacetime cosmos, but also in some ways temporal. 
With respect for the great doctors of the church in the past, I have found neither
Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time [1992],
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the everlasting nor the atemporal models finally satisfactory. I have promoted a 
third alternative which one hopes preserves key insights from both of the traditional 
views.
The basic picture of relative timelessness is this:
(1) God’s time is infinite and immeasurable. Because they are involved in created 
frames of reference and depend upon stable laws of nature, measured time 
words like ‘day’ or ‘week’ do not properly apply to eternity. All points of our 
created time are simultaneous with some points of God’s eternity, but our 
spacetime universe does not measure God’s infinite temporality.
(2) God’s life is in no way defective or undermined by the passage of time. God 
is the Lord of time, not its prisoner.
(3) Because God is a dynamic and changing being, God is still temporal in some 
sense: God is immutable in essence, but changing in inter-relationship with 
the world and with us. Because God is a changing being, God has to be 
temporal to some degree. For this reason there are intervals within God’s 
life, but those intervals have no specific or intrinsic temporal measure.
This viewpoint has recently been adopted and modified by Gary DeWeese2 under 
the name ‘omnitemporality’. I’m happy to accept that as another way of talking 
about this third model. Having introduced this third perspective, we turn to alterna­
tive viewpoints on divine eternity and survey some of their problems.
7.2 The Biblical Witness
Over recent decades I have moved more fully into the discipline of Christian doc­
trine (i. e., systematic and moral theology). I have come to appreciate more than I 
did before the importance of allowing biblical theology and the biblical narrative 
of God, creation, Israel, Jesus, and the early church to give a decisive shape to the 
doctrine of God. What is important here is not only the words used for eternity in 
the Bible, or even the isolated sayings about God and time, but also the character 
of God in the biblical story. When we put together all of these kinds of sources, it 
becomes quite clear that the Christian Bible presents us with a view of God in which 
God is not absolutely timeless but rather eternal in the sense of everlasting. Psalm 
90:2 is a good example: ‘Before the mountains were born, and You gave birth to 
the earth and world, from eternity to eternity You are God.’ The Hebrew word for 
‘eternity’ here (olam) means a long period of time (not a timeless eternity) and is 
often translated as everlasting.’ This is consistent with the narratives concerning 
God and Israel or the Church. For example, the prophet Isaiah (speaking for God) 
proclaims: ‘I the Lord, the first and the last, I am He’ (Is 41:4). A God who exists 
from the first to the last is an everlasting Lord, not a timeless one. This is the view­
point of the vast majority of biblical scholarship, especially since Oscar Cullmann’s 
important monograph, Christ and Time [l950]. For this reason as a Christian
2 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time [2004].
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theologian I believe that the everlasting model is the one we should begin with 
in thinking about God and time in the discipline of systematic theology. We need 
reasons to modify this view. The classical tradition has long provided such reasons, 
of course, but they did not always begin with the priority of the Scriptures and 
historical reality of Jesus Christ for the doctrine of God, the way many contempo­
rary theologians (I among them) think we should.
My friend and esteemed colleague William Lane Craig, one of the world’s great 
experts on time, eternity, and the nature of God, has recently argued that the Bible 
is more ambiguous on this topic than one might think at first glance.3 He sees the 
biblical teaching of creatio ex nihilo as setting up or implying an absolute beginning 
to time. I do agree with Craig that creation out of nothing is a biblical doctrine. 
There is good support for the doctrine of creation out of nothing in passages like 2 
Macc 7:25, Rom 4:7 and Heb 11:3 (cf. 2 En 24:2). What I cannot agree with is that 
creation out of nothing is taught in Gen 1. Even if we read the opening sentence 
of the Bible as an independent sentence which makes a kind of title for the whole 
section, and not as a temporal clause as some Bible translations have it, Gen 1 does 
not itself teach creation out of nothing.4 The presence of a formless waste and the 
waters of the deep lead to the conclusion that this chapter is teaching a creation 
out of chaos, as almost all academic exegetes will agree. Old Testament scholar 
Terry Fretheim writes, ‘The word beginning probably does not refer to the absolute 
beginning of all things, but to the beginning of the ordered creation, including 
the temporal order’.5 The evidence for a creation out of nothing in Gen 1 is too 
weak to support Craigs conclusions. What we might find in the text of Gen 1, 
and its seven-day creation, is the beginning of ordered time or measured time. 
As John Edward Wright puts this, ‘with Gen 1 cosmic time and historical time 
begin’.6 That Gen 1 implies an absolute beginning to time itself, i. e., to metaphysical 
time or pure duration, is a conclusion which goes beyond the biblical data. This 
point about Gen 1 which we must press against Craig does introduce an important 
distinction: the difference between (1) measured time, that is cosmic or physical 
time, the time of science, clocks, and calendars, which does begin with the origin 
of the spacetime cosmos; and (2) metaphysical time or pure duration, which may 
not have any beginning at all.
The Bible does unambiguously point to a God who is temporal but also eternal 
(everlasting). The burden of proof for theologians should be on the side of a timeless 
God. So what are the problems with the everlasting viewpoint? We do seem to have 
some sense of the transcendence of God, requiring that She be outside of any merely 
created category. For example, we hold that God is beyond space or spaceless, and 
is infinite in being while all other things are finite. The main problem with the 
everlasting model is not logical consistency but theological inadequacy. Given our 
notion of God as an infinite, personal creator, we would expect God to transcend
3 Craig, Time and Eternity [200l], pp. 14-20.
4 Contra Copan and Craig, Creation Out of Nothing [2004].
5 Fretheim, Genesis [1994], p. 342.
6 Wright, Cosmogony, Cosmology [2006], p. 755.
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time in some way. Merely knowing the future, and living forever, is not enough to 
satisfy this demand. Another important point is pressed by recent developments 
in physics. We would join with St Augustine and many others to insist that time 
in some sense is a created category which came into existence with the physical 
universe. Space and time - or we had better say spacetime - has a beginning, but 
God does not. Spacetime is warped by the presence of matter; but God is not. Thus 
God must be beyond time as we know it in science, at least in some way. This is 
a continuing problem for an everlasting view of eternity. I will argue that what 
we will call in general ‘physical time’ began with the creation of the universe, and 
distinguish this from a ‘metaphysical time’: a time which can go by without change, 
without material things, and without laws of nature. This allows us to affirm that 
spacetime had a beginning in time without thinking that metaphysical time had a 
beginning.
7.3 Problems with Timeless Eternity
What, then, of an absolutely timeless God, that is, what about the classical tradition 
of divine eternity as totum simul? Logically one problem with the classical view 
that keeps appearing is the attempt to write temporality back onto the being of the 
One who is utterly timeless. This often happens when thinking of eternity as if all of 
time could actually be at one time. In the actual world both the reality of temporality 
and the process of becoming between things and events enters into the core being 
of created reality. When we abstract from this dynamic reality in mathematics and 
physics or in theology and philosophy we can discover important truths but are 
leaving behind an essential part of the actual world. The standard classical model of 
all of time being “at once” before a timeless God leaves behind something important 
about the world God has created, namely, the dynamic character of time and history.
Recent philosophers, including our esteemed colleagues Eleonore Stump and 
Brian Leftow, have attempted to create a model of eternity that is consistent with the 
A-theory or dynamic theory of time. I do agree that the classical model of a timeless 
creator and sustainer of the world is internally coherent, but only when we reject or 
abandon the dynamic theory of time for a stasis or B-theory. Some philosophers are 
willing to embrace this conclusion. As Katherin Rogers recently wrote, ‘ [C] riticisms 
of the tenseless view of time are not powerful enough to necessitate abandoning 
the venerable tradition of an eternal God’7 Unlike some critics, I believe that the 
atemporal model is logically consistent, but only when one adopts a stasis theory of 
time can such a God interact with creation.8
7 Rogers, Omniscience, Eternity, and Freedom [1996], p. 408. This is also found in her new 
book, TheAnselmian Approach [1997].
8 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time [1992], pp. 76-81.
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Because a timeless God is alive, God’s life will have a timeless, ‘atemporal exten­
sive mode of existence’.9 As was argued by John Duns Scotus in the Middle Ages, 
God’s being has succession only in a conceptual sense, not in a temporal one.10 But 
such a God will not be able to change in order to interact with a created, contingent 
world that comes into being and passes out of being, wich the process or dynamic 
theory of time demands. The main difference between process and stasis (or A- and 
B-) theories has to do with temporal passage. Imagine a time T, in the far future, and 
an event E which (let us say) will certainly happen at T. If we take the combination, 
£-at-T, we can get a sense of the difference between the process and stasis views. 
For the stasis view, £-at-T is real always. Of course, E is not real now, but then 
neither view thinks it is. Rather, the stasis view believes that E is always real at T 
(and only at T). The process theory, however, denies that E is always real at T. E is 
only fully real when T is now, when T is the present moment. Nothing is real-at-T 
unless T is present. Of course, on the process theory, you can contrast the abstract 
set of all things past, present, and future that will ever be real with illusions, myths, 
and other non-real things. But within that set, for the process view, only present 
things are fully real. Past things used to be real, and future things will be real. If 
this view of time is correct, then either a timeless God does the same thing forever, 
and cannot interact with time; or God must change somehow over time not merely 
in appearance but in reality. For the action of God sustains all things in their very 
being-in-becoming.
Some esteemed and learned philosophers, whose work deserves more careful 
analysis than I can give it here, have sought to avoid this conclusion. I am thinking 
especially of Eleonore Stump and Brian Leftow. They have sought to make coherent 
a timeless model of divine eternity with a dynamic theory of temporal passage. They 
want to press the point that God co-exists with every moment of time while not 
becoming temporal himself. What we need, however, is not mere co-existence but 
a theory of direct divine action in which God acts upon and interacts with temporal 
things at moments which do not and cannot all exist at once. By thinking that past, 
present and future things can somehow exist all at once, we do violence to the idea 
that reality is fully temporal. Only present things are fully real; past things used to
9 Stump and Kretzmann, Atemporal Duration [1987], p. 215. Stump and Kretzmann later 
insist that their language of a ‘timeless now’, a ‘timeless simultaneity’ and a ‘timeless duration’ 
are meant to be analogies, in Stump and Kretzmann, Eternity, Awareness, and Action 
[1992], pp. 463-82, esp. 464-5. Stump and Kretzmann use terms like timeless ‘duration’, 
timeless ‘now’, and timeless ‘simultaneity’ because they wish to retain some aspects of 
the ordinary predicates. But why not use ordinary words when possible? Especially in 
specialist publications (like theirs), it is better to use ordinary terms in univocal predica­
tion, to avoid confusion and hasty conclusions. For example, if they had used ‘timeless 
co-existence’ instead of‘£T-simultaneity’ in the publications, a great deal of confusion (and 
a few errors on their part) could have been avoided.
10 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I [1950], I, d. 9 8c d. 43. This work is sometimes entitled Opus 
Oxoniense, but is called Ordinatio in the beautiful modern critical edition of Duns Scotus, 
Opera Omnia [1950].
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be real and future things will be real. Past and future are not fully real, and to think 
they are is to abstract from and leave behind a key element of created existence in 
the actual world.
What I am saying is that the very idea that all times co-exist timelessly with God 
in eternity is incoherent. First of all, things which exist in time cannot co-exist 
timelessly. Nothing that is temporal can also be timeless. In the second place, all 
times cannot and do not co-exist in any sense - and certainly not ‘timelessly5 or ‘in 
eternity5. Different times are not all present, and only present things are fully real 
(on the process view). Therefore, they cannot co-exist with present things.
The Special Theory of Relativity does not change this logical fact, but forces us to 
say, ‘present according to what system of measurement?5 An event may be present 
in one system of measurement, but past in another. However, a timeless God does 
not have a system of measurement. God co-exists with the true present, that is, the 
real moment of becoming, in the life of everything in the universe. If the physical 
universe as a whole is in the process of becoming (as the process theory demands), 
then so is each object (really existing thing) in it. Even a timeless God must await 
the future of any and all objects in the universe, in order to act directly upon future 
(non-existent) episodes of that object. Thus a timeless God must do exactly the same 
thing forever, and cannot change to interact with a changing reality. This argument, 
of course, presupposes a process theory of time.
Defenders of Gods timeless being are often captured by a picture. This is a picture 
of God, high and lifted up, seeing all of time at once, in the way an observer on a 
high hill can see the whole of a road at once. The problem here is that only one step 
of the road exists, even for the observer. The typical abstraction of thinking about 
all events forever in spacetime is just that: an abstraction. In reality, on the process 
theory, time is not like space. I have elsewhere given fuller time to a consideration 
and critique of their theories, and cannot repeat all of that here.11 Interestingly, 
John Duns Scotus considered similar ideas in his Lectura centuries ago, and rejected 
them, making the following comment: ‘If all future beings were present to God 
according to their actual existence, it would be impossible for God to cause them 
to exist anew.’12 Since timeless existence is so very different from temporal being, 
even if every event existed in Gods timeless “frame of reference” then God would 
have to re-create all events within the flow of temporal passage - which is absurd.
Just what is so bad with the stasis theory, then? If we have a strong attach­
ment to atemporal eternity, can we not choose to hold on to a stasis theory of 
time? Here my only comment would be that we should allow philosophy of science 
and metaphysics to put forward the best theory. It is inappropriate for doctrinal 
theology or philosophy of religion to dictate in advance the conclusion that other
11 Padgett, Eternity [1993], pp. 219-23. Some of these same criticisms can be found in 
Craig, The Special Theory of Relativity [1994], pp. 19-37.
12 ‘Si omnia futura essentpraesentia Deo secundum eorum actualem existentiam, impossibile 
esset Deo causare aliquid de novo.' (Duns Scotus, Lectura I [1950], d. 39, q. 5, sec. 28) There 
is an English translation and commentary on this Distinction, entitled Contingency and 
Freedom [1994].
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sciences or disciplines must embrace. Coherence with other truths is an important 
criterion for any theory, including our theology of eternity. My own work in the 
philosophy of time has convinced me that the process theory of time is correct. 
Thus I cannot embrace the traditional model of timeless eternity. Of course I respect 
those who come to different conclusions, but I would argue with their metaphysical 
understanding of temporal reality.
7.4 Timelessness sans Creation
Recently Craig has come up with an interesting twist on the traditional view that 
takes seriously the dynamic character of creation. His new view is that God is 
timelessly eternal before the first moment of creation and the first change (and here 
‘before’ must be a logical or causal before, not a temporal one). God then becomes 
a temporal being with the creation of time itself. I have a problem with this model, 
but thinking through Craig’s arguments has also forced me to change my mind in 
one respect which I will spell out later.
The problem I have with Craig’s model has to do with the necessary connections 
between time and change. Bringing all of the cosmos into existence at or soon after 
the first change is a decisive event in the history of God and of all existence. In 
order for this to happen, something has to change. For all eternity past, even before 
all creation, God is at least capable of changing in order to make reality be in the 
first place. This change cannot be attributed to the world, for the world did not yet 
exist back then. I have argued for some time that there is a necessary relationship 
between time and change. It is a principle that goes like this: necessarily, if change is 
possible for something then that thing is temporal in some way. Earlier I spelled out 
this relationship in a long argument involving modal counterfactual logic. I have 
since then come upon a much shorter argument which I would like to present here 
for the first time.
First, I will propose as a principle of reason confirmed by experience the follow­
ing proposition: without time nothing can change. Time and change are not the 
same thing, and time can possibly go by without any change happening. But when 
we imagine an infinitely thin slice of some event, in which no duration, no temporal 
extension occurs at all, then change simply cannot happen at that instant. Change 
takes time to happen, and in fact some philosophers have gone so far as to define 
change as an entity having different properties at different times.
Yet we have not gone far enough. Where there is no duration, that is, no tempo­
ral extension of any kind, then change is not even possible. It is not just that as a 
matter of fact no change can happen in a durationless instant. It is metaphysically 
impossible for any change to take place. Imagine such an instantaneous time slice of 
a colloquium. In that snap-shot of time, nothing can change simply because change 
takes time. In that durationless instant change is not even possible.
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One more modal point needs to be made. The principle I am speaking of does 
not just apply in the actual world. It is a necessary truth, flowing from the very idea 
of change itself. It applies in all possible worlds of necessity. This gets us to our first 
proposition. If we let X range across things or events, then:
Necessarily, if a duration does not occur for X then change is not possible 
for X. In symbols this would be:
1.
(1) n[-iD(x) -*■ -»O C(x)]
Where D is a symbol for duration, and C for change. Now in a short logical 
step or two we can reach the principle we want:
Necessarily, if change is possible for X then a duration occurs for X. Again, 
in symbols:
2.
(2) n[OC(x) - D(x)]
Applying principle (2) to the case of God before the first change, that is, before 
creation, we get this truth: If God is even capable of change at all, then God is in 
some way temporal. When we reflect upon the very first change in the life of God, 
the momentous change of bringing about the physical spacetime universe in the 
beginning, that change belongs to God alone. So God must be capable of change 
for Craig, even without or before creation. Yet principle (2) means that God must 
still be temporal in some way even apart from creation, if it is even possible for God 
to change. Principle (2) is also the reason that I define metaphysical time as the 
dimension of the possibility of change.
While we should not accept Craig’s viewpoint because of the problem I have just 
outlined, we can go pretty far along with him. I now think that we should restrict 
the term ‘relative timelessness’ to the non-finite eternity of God before creation and 
before all change. Before creation, although time does go by there was no change, 
i. e., no alteration in the infinite being and blessed rest of the triune God. There were 
no true intervals or metrics to mark off the passage of time: just pure duration, pure 
being without change. God only changes to bring about the first moment of physical 
time and of all creation with it. Once God does bring about a world, then things 
change for God as well as for creatures. What about God’s eternity after creation? 
I would now accept the term ‘omnitemporal’ from Gary DeWeese, in which God’s 
time or eternity transcends physical time by being infinite and immeasurable. So I 
would change Craig’s model only in this respect: before the first change, God is rela­
tively timeless, and also contingently without change (but still capable of changing). 
With creation God becomes omnitemporal, entering into a relative change with us, 
while still being immutable in those essential properties which set off God as fully 
divine.
I have argued in this chapter that both of the traditional notions of eternity 
have their problems. In dialogue with Craig I have proposed a modified version 
of relative timelessness for divine eternity. Prior to creation, God is changeless and 
free of temporal measure or temporal decay, that is, before creation God is relatively
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timeless. After creation, God is essentially immutable but changes in relationship 
with a dynamic world of time. In other words, after creation God is omnitemporal. 
For all eternity God is in some ways temporal, yet is never bound by time. Thus in 
dialogue with my colleagues and critics I have learned to alter my earlier position, 
and so develop and strengthen the notion of relative timelessness.
